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VOL. I., No. 3. DES MOINES, IOWA, OCTOÜER, 1S93. THIRD SERIES.
MAJOR-GENERAL G. M. DODGE.
BY EX-GOV. CYRUS C. CARPENTER.
One of the first responses to the patriotic impulse inspired
by the fall of Fort Sumter was from a young civil engineer
of Council Bluffs. He was probably as well equipped for the
business of war as any man who entered the service from
Iowa. He was an earnest patriot. He was thoroughly in .
sympathy with the administration of President Lincoln. He
possessed the industry and tenacity .of a New England an-
cestry. He had a taste for military studies, and love for mili-
tary drill and tactics. He had graduated at a school of civil
engineering, and subsequently at a private military academy.
He had been employed in the location of railroad lines, and
in the construction of railroads. He had a trained eye,
capable of taking in a strategic situation at a glance. He
had been engaged in freighting upon the western plains,
until he was physically hardened and prepared for the depri-
vations of the camp and the hardships of the march. He was
self-reliant when intrusted with discretionary power, and had
the instinct of military subordination when acting under the
immediate command of a superior officer. He was a disciplin-
arian, and yet thoroughly in sympathy with the democratic
instincts of the volunteer soldiery. He was alert, active, enter-
prising and untiring. Such are the attributes which con-
stitute the ideal soldier, and these were elements in the char-
acter of General Grenville Mellen Dodge, of whose career
the following pages are an imperfect recital.
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He was boru at Putnamville, Danvers, Massachusetts,
April 12, 1831. When but ten years old an ambition to ob-
lain au education became the ruliug passion of his life. To
;secure advantages beyond those offered by the common school,
which he had been able to attend during the winter months
'Only—with the same force of character which distinguished
!him iiu after life—he for a time drove a butcher's cart; then for
'thiree years had charge of the fruit and vegetable farm of Mrs.
iEdward Lander, the products of which he marketed in Salem.
[During the time that his summers were occupied in this severe
tóil.'he was engaged in the winter mouths as a clerk in a small
store at South Danvers, to which the postoffice was attached,
and where his father was the postmaster. Even whilst his
time was thus occupied, he found occasional leisure hours,
.especially during the long winter evenings, to devote to study.
Iu the winter of 1845-6 he attended the academy at Dur-
;ham. New Hampshire; and iu 1846 entered Norwich Uni-
-versity of Vermont, in the scientific department. In 1850 he
• graduated from this school as a civil engineer; and in the fol-
lovving year from Captain Partridge's Military Academy. Im-
mediately after his graduation, armed with his diploma as a
.civil engineer, he left for the West aud located in Peru, Illinois.
Here he was engaged for a few months in city and laud sur-
veys; and during the closing weeks of 1851 was employed
by the Illinois Central Railroad Compauy in making a sur-
--vey for that road between Dixon and Bloomiugton.
Following this, he secured a positiou as civil engineer under
Peter A. Dey, at Tiskilwa, Illinois, ou the Chicago and
Rock Island Railroad; and was entrusted with the survey of
the Peoria branch. He remained with Mr. Dey. with head-
. quarters at Iowa City, until the final location of the Missis-
: sippi & Missouri River Railroad across the State from Daven-
port to Council Bluffs, and wa^ the assistant engineer during
the cou.structiou of this road from Davenport to Iowa City.
lEarly in his connection with these surveys he wrote a letter
:to his home in Massachusetts prophesying the building of the
.Pacific Railroad, and indicating the very route upon which
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eighteen years afterwards he was chiefly instrumental in locat-
ing it. The Pacific Railroad enterprise grew to be an ever
present project in his active and restless mind. So, in 1853,
he made a reconnaissance west of the Missouri river, and up
the Platte, with the view of determining its probable location.
And from 1853 to 1861, as he could secure the leisure from
his other exacting business enterprises, he continued these ex-
plorations. Whilst they were largely the voluntary pastimes
of his projective mind, yet he was always aided and encour-
aged by Mr. Henry Farnham and Mr. Thomas C. Durant, who
were his early and constant friends.
November 11, 1854, he settled in Council Bluffs, and in
addition to ' his engineering projects, engaged in the business
of freighting across the plains, in which he was more or less
interested up to i860; having visited in connection with his
business, and for traffic with various Indian tribes, the valley
of Cherry Creek, at the very point where Denver now stands,
and many of the settlements in New Mexico. He was also
instrumental in establishing the banking house of Baldwin &
Dodge, which was afterwards merged into the Pacific National
Bank, of which he became president. It is now the Council
Bluffs Savings Bank, of which his brother, N. P. Dodge, is the
president. With all these enterprises engaging his attention,
he found time, in 1856, to organize and drill a military com-
pany, known as the Council Bluffs Guards, of which he was
elected Captain, and which maintained its organization until
1861.
When Fort Sumter was fired upon, and the call for 75,000
troops was issued by the President, he immediately tendered
his own services, and, with the approval of his men, that of his
independent company, to the Governor. His services were
declined, as the Governor did not deem it wise at that time to
draw any military forces from the western border of the State.
Governor Kirkwood, however, appointed him to a position on
his staff, and sent him to Washington to obtain arms and am-
munition with which to arm the independent companies of the
State, in order to be in readiness to repel any attempted inva-
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sion upon the Missouri border. Notwithstanding the failure
of the Congressional delegation to secure these arms, upon
his representation to the authorities of the dangers threaten-
ing the southern border of the State, and of the propriety and
practicability of committing its defense to the State, he pro-
cured an order for 6,ooo stand of arms and the required
ammunition. ;
The military judgment and resolute persistency witli which
he pursued his purpose while at Washington convinced the
War Department that he possessed the characteristics to make
a useful officer in a military command. He was accordingly
tendered a Captaincy in the Regular Army. This he declined,,
not becau.se the offer was not a flattering recognition of his zeal
and ability, but because he had tendered his services to the
Governor of the State, and had been entrusted with an impor-
tant liiission which he regarded as binding him in honor to
cast his lot with the military fortunes of Iowa. Upon his
declining the Captaincy, the Secretary of War was so impres.sed.
with his natural military capacity that he suggested by letter
to the Governor that it would advance the public interest to
give him the Colonelcy of a regiment. Immediately upon
his return from Washington he was appointed Colonel of the
Fourth Iowa Infantry, and adopting his independent com-
pany, of Council Bluffs, as the nucleus of the organization, he
entered upon the duty of recruiting and organizing a regi-
ment. To comprehend fuUyi the difficulties that confronted
him in this undertaking, it must be understood that the regi-
ment was recruited after the first flush of enthusiasm at the
beginning of the war had abated, and was largely drawn from
the Missouri Slope, then but sparsely populated, by pioneers who
had just begun the struggle of laying the foundations of new
homes in a new country. But the military service had now
become the absorbing thought of his intense mind ; and night
and day he pursued the one. purpose until he was ready to
mount his horse and give the command to march. Before he
had assembled the entire command and had fully completed
the organization, with his natural alertness and enterprise he
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began to look about for somebody to whip. During the sum-
mer Colonel Poindexter, a Confederate partisan, had been
hanging about the northwestern border of Missouri, threaten-
ing the settlements in southwestern Iowa, and particularly
breaking into the traffic of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Rail-
road. So Colonel Dodge took such of his Regiment as were
available, drove him into southwestern Missouri, and for the
time being broke up his command. He then returned to
Council Bluffs and completed the organization of his regi-
ment. His success in recruiting had secured the enlistment
of a larger number of men than was necessary for a single
regiment; so he asked and obtained authority to organize in
connection with it a battery of artillery, known as Dodge's
Battery, but appearing in the Iowa Roster as the Second Iowa
Battery. As the time approached for moving with his com-
mand to report for duty, difficulties thickened and annoying
delays resulted from the apparent impossibility of securing, in
presence of the overwhelming demands upon the Government,
the necessary equipments and supplies for his regiment and
battery. These obstacles, however, he overcame by pledging
his own credit for their necessary outfit.
In August, 1861, he reported with his regiment and battery
to General Fremont, at St. Louis, and was ordered to Rolla,
Missouri.
He had now reached a position where the unwearying
activities of his mind could find employment. His fitness for
independent discretion was soon recognized, and he was as-
signed to the command of the Post. Missouri at this time
was a harvest field of partisan border warfare. While the
State did not attempt by formal action to secede from the
Union, a large minority at least of its population were Seces-
sionists. It supplied to the Confederate Government a good-
si'ied army, and a convention of Secessionists in some remote
h.ding-place had even adopted a rebel constitution and had
put in operation a traveling State government. George G.
Vest, one of the present United States Senators, was sent as a.
Senator to Richmond. The hostile sentiment, dividing the
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population which remained at home, made the State a rich
recruiting ground for active rebel fugitives who possessed too
much brigandism to enter the regular rebel service, in which
to some extent the principles of civilized warfare were en-
forced. They, therefore, remained in the State and called
around them adventurous followers who sympathized with the
Rebellion, and whom they organized into semi-military com-
mands with which they went trooping through the country prey-
ing upon any of the population known to have Union proclivi-
ties. And whenever they could' fall upon a small detachment
of Union soldiers, remote from military support, they would if
possible lead them into an ambush, where, in the language of
the day, they could " bushwhack" them. The social condi-
tion of the State is illustrated by a circumstance related to me
by a neighbor of mine in Fort Dodge. At the beginning ot
the war he lived in Missouri. In the spring of 1861 he went
with his brother-in-law to hunt cattle which they supposed
had strayed into a rough and unsettled portion of the State,
and were absent from home iwhen Eort Sumter was fired
upon. Whilst returning, they niet a man from the settlements
who had heard the news and who told them that the President
had called for 75,000 men with which to put down the Rebel-
lion. " Well," said my neighbor's brother-in-law, " if that is
the case, I am going with the South." The other said, " I
shall stay by the old flag and the old Government." And
without dismounting they shook hands, bade each other good-
bye and parted, not to meet again until after the close of the
war. The spirit of treason and ruffianism had been schooled
and hardened by six years of turmoil in the vain attempt, by
armed interference and invasion, to force slavery upon Kansas.
Colonel Dodge was of the right mould to deal with a popula-
tion composed of these chaotic elements. He had the judi-
cial mind which enabled him to weigh and balance causes ;
and yet he was firm and unbending in his devotion to the
Union and its friends.
In war as in other avocations men are fitted by temperament
and character for the various requirements of the service. A
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man may be competent to command a regiment or a brigade,
and as part of a larger command would be a most gallant and
reliable officer. But give that very officer an independent com-
mand, aud he might have neither the euterprise nor alertness
to discover and guard the exposed points of his command, to
explore the roads which should be picketed, or to meander
the streams and sound the fords which should be watched.
But the man who, when a civil engineer of the Mississippi
& Missouri Railroad, had found time to explore the unset-
tled and Indian-haunted region between the Missouri River
and the summits of the Rocky Mountains, impelled solely by
the activity and energy of his nature, was not the kind of a
man to be caught napping iu an enemy's country. He could
divine the purpose of an enemy because he knew what he
would be doing himself, if he was in the place of that enemy.
Col. Dodge's command at Rolla illustrates his metal. By
personal inspection, aud through his scouts, he e.xplored every
road and meandered every stream for miles around ; ac-
quainted himself with the geography of the country ; knew the
movements of every partisan guerrilla chieftain ; and was
informed, ancl furnished information to the commander of the
Department, of the various movements connected with the
organization of the Rebel army in southwestern Missouri.
During the time he was in command at Rolla he brought
order out of chaos in the territory over which his jurisdic-
tion extended.
When General Samuel R. Curtis organized the army of the
southwest. Col. Dodge was assigned to command the First
Brigade of the Fourth Division, commanded by Acting Briga-
dier General Eugene A. Carr. In the movement to drive Price
and his army from Missouri, which resulted in the battle ot
Pea Ridge, he led the advance upon Springfield, where it was
supposed Price would offer battle. In this connection General
Carr, in his report, relates a somewhat amusing incident. On
the morning of the day the command marched into Spring-
field, his division, with Dodge's brigade in advance, arrived at
a point about five miles from the town before daylight, where
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he ordered a halt, to give time for the other divisions to come
up and deploy. But one compariy of the Fourth Iowa, which
had been thrown forward as skirmishers, did not get the order
and pushed forward into Springfield, which had been evacu-
ated during the night, capturing quite a number of prisoners
and a large quantity of stores. ¡
The Army of the Southwest; scarcely halted at Springfield,
but pushed on into northwestern Arkansas, whither Price had
fled. As Price fell back he was joined by various detachments
from Arkansas ; and as his army was augmented by these re-
enforcements, he would half resolve on giving his pursuers bat-
tle. Finally, at Sugar Creek, he made quite a determined
stand, but after a brisk skirmish, led by the Fourth Division,
in which Col. Dodge's brigade took a prominent part, a cavalry
charge was ordered, when the enemy again retreated. Price
now moved to the vicinity of Boston Mountains where he was
joined by General McCuUoch with eleven regiments, and by
General Pike with five regiments ; which gave him an army of
30,000 troops. To oppose these, all told. General Curtis had
but 12,095 men. With these he had to protect his long line of
communications by leaving garrisons at Marshfield, Springfield,
Cassville, and Keetsville; thus reducing his force to barely
10,500 infantry and cavalry, with which to meet and repel this
enemy. General Van Dorn was in command of the combined
Rebel army. General Curtis had necessarily spread his com-
mand over quite a wide territory in order to secure forage and
supplies. Hi.s first and second divisions, commanded by Sigel
and Asboth, were four miles from Bentonville. The fourth
division was at Cross Hollow, where also was the headquarters
of General Curtis, and Col. Vandever with his brigade of the
fourth division was at Huntsville. On the 5th of March the
commanding General learned that the entire Rebel force was
marching from his rendezvous near Boston Mountains to
offer battle. General Curtis inimediately dispatched couriers
to the division commanders with orders to march to Sugar
Creek, where Col. Jefferson C. Davis, in command of the
third division,-was in position. The fourth division, at Cross
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Hollow, twelve miles from Sugar Creek, immediately took
up the line of march at 6 o'clock p. M., and arrived on the
chosen battle-field at 2 o'clock A. M. The field selected by
General Curtis was on the bluffs and projecting points over-
looking Sugar Creek, a stream running through quite a wide
valley, along which ran the main roads from Fayetteville by
Bentonville to KeetsviUe, and also from Fayetteville by Cross
Hollow to KeetsviUe. In the rear was a somewhat broken
plain called Pea Ridge, extending back in the direction of
Cross Hollow. About three miles to the rear of this position
was a road running nearly parallel with Sugar Creek and with
the proposed line of battle.
General Curtis anticipated, as did his subordinate officers,
that the rebels would be likely to march across his flank, with
the view of reaching this road in his rear. He therefore ordered
Colonel Dodge to proceed to this road, and by falling the tim-
ber in reach of it, obstruct as far as possible the advance of
the enemy in this direction. As was his habit this order was
oerformed thoroughly. His command worked • unceasingly
until long after midnight, cutting every tree available to
make a thorough obstruction. As was anticipated, daylight
found the Ilebel force making a flank movement to gain this
road. This necessitated a change of front, which was accom-
plished about half past ten A. M., of the 7th. The advantage to
our army of the work of General Dodge and his command in
obstructing tliis road is thus told subsequently by General Van
Dorn, in his official report : " I halted the head of my column
near the point where the road by which I proposed to move
diverges, threw out my pickets, and bivouacked as if for the
night. But soon after dark I marched again, moving Price's
division in advance, and taking the road by which I hoped
before daylight to reach the rear of the enemy. Obstructions,
which he had hastily thrown in the way, so impeded our
march that we did not gain the Telegraph road until near ten
A. M., of the 7th." Immediately after the changes which this
disposition of the enemy necessitated, the new right (which
before the change of front had been the left) near Elk Horn
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Tavern was fiercely assailed. This was the position occupied
by General Carr ; and the extrenie right, near Elk Horn Tavern
and beyond, was the position of Colonel Dodge's brigade. Here
ensued and continued with little cessation for seven long hours
a most fearful engagement. At times, as the enemy would
attempt some new movement in;his endeavor to turn the flank
of Dodge's Brigade, it would ¡Ibecome a desperate conflict.
But here the Division stood with its face to the foe ; Dodge,
being on the extreme right, was in the exposed position, really
occupying the objective point îof the enemy. General Carr
asked for re-enforcements earlyl in the day, immediately upon
his discovering that with some 2,500 men he was holding at bay
10,000 or 12,000 of the enemyj But as a severe conflict was
in progress in the center, where General Jeff C. Davis was
in command, most of the re-eriforcements that were available
were diverted to the center, whilst General Curtis sent his aid
to Carr, with a message which in its brevity and almost
despairing tone was absolutely pathetic : " I can only ask you
to persevere." And Curtis says in his report : " He did perse-
vere, and the sad havoc in the Ninth and Fourth Iowa regi-
. ments and Pheips' Missouri and Weston's Twenty-fourth Mis-
souri, and all the troops in that division, will show how earnest
and continuous was their perseverance." Finally at 2 o'clock
in the afternoon he learned that ¡the left, occupied by Sigel and
Asboth, had not been under fire during the day, whilst, in
the language of his report, " tlie enemy had melted away in
the brushy center ;" and he says : " I had now resolved to
bring up the left and center to meet the gathering hordes at
Elk Horn Tavern." General Curtis himself accompanied Gen-
eral Asboth. It was about five o'clock in the afternoon when
the advance of General Asboth's column reached the vicinity.
The Fourth Division was nearly out of ammunition, and was
slowly falling back, but fiercely contesting every inch of ground.
General Curtis says in his report "that the Fourth Iowa was
falling back for cartridges, in line, dressing on their colors
in perfect order." He says : '' Colonel Dodge came up ex-
plaining the want of cartridges, but being informed of the
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reinforcements at hand, and that General Asboth was planting
his batteries in the road, from which he soon opened fire, the
Fourth and Ninth regiments, with fixed bayonets, though
without cartridges, made a charge, driving the enemy from
their front." And he says: "These two regiments won imper-
ishable honors on that day." The batteries continued a tre-
mendous fire, but their ammunition was finally exhausted, and
darkness put an end to the conflict. The infantry lay on their
arms during the night with their dead and wounded comrades
scattered about them, and the following morning the con-
flict was opened with renewed force. General Curtis had re-
adjusted his lines during the night. In the morning he con-
fronted the enemy with a continuous line on open and com-
paratively unbroken ground, which admitted easy evolutions
to meet the enemy at exposed points. The enemy occupied
the broken ground and gorges at the head waters of Sugar
Creek. The ground he occupied was not suited to movements
to the right or left to reinforce points of attack. Our troops
felt their advantage. The extreme right was occupied as the
day before, by Dodge's brigade. After the contest had been
continued for some time, the right and left wings had so far
advanced as to threaten an enfilading fire upon the flanks
of the enemy, when he broke and fled from the field, seeking
safety in precipitous flight through gorges of the hills.
The losses tell the story of the battle. Loss of the First
Division (Sigel's), 144; the Second (Asboth's), 119; the Third
(Davis'), 329 ; the Fourth (Carr's), 701. I have always thought
—and reviewing these reports thirty years after the battle has
passed into history, I am confirmed in the opinion—that Sigel's
efforts to reach and reinforce the Fourth division, after two
o'clock on the second day of the battle, were, to say the least,
not very enthusiastic. He took a circuitous route and made a
leisurely march when he knew that the right of the army was
holding its ground against fearful odds and at fearful cost.
General Curtis in closing his report, after commending the
division commanders, says : " I also again present commanders
of brigades. Colonels Dodge, Osterhaus, Vandever, White,.
172 ANNALS OF IOWA.
I
Shaefer, Patterson and Greusel. The three first named I especial-
ly commend." General Carr says, speaking of the fierce contest
on the right, the second day : . " During all this time Colonel
Dodge had sustained a constant engagement with the enemy.
He placed himself on the hither side of the field near demon's
house, and though immediately outnumbered and in point
blank range of grape, held his position until his ammunition
gave out, when he retired a short distance, waited for the
enemy's approach, gave him a last volley, which checked and
turned him, and then marched off the field with colors flying,
and bringing his wounded men along. Colonel Dodge had
three horses shot under him, one of them being struck with
twenty balls, and was wounded himself, though not so severely
as to leave the field."
Thus closed with a complete victory the battle of Pea
Ridge. It was Colonel Dodge's first " baptism of fire," and
fixed his place in the army as a[ cool-headed and level-headed
fighter. For his service in this battle, upon the recommenda-
tion of General Halleck, he was appointed Brigadier General.
Owing to his wound and hard service, after the battle of Pea
Ridge, he was compelled to take a short respite from the duties
of the camp and the hardships of the campaign. As soon,
however, as he had recovered;; he was assigned to duty at
Columbus, Kentucky. Here he had before him a task suited
to his genius. The Mobile & Ohio Railroad had been greatly
impaired, a large number of the bridges destroyed, and much
of the rolling stock had been; burned and made way with
during the campaigns in western Kentucky and Tennessee.
When Corinth was finally occupied by General Halleck's army,
this railway as a line of supply became a necessity. To its
reconstruction General Dodge brought his experience as a
railroad engineer and railroad builder. Whilst thus engaged
he found employment for his military skill in guarding the
entire liue from the constantly threatened raids of the guer-
rillas. In these efforts he met and captured General Faulkner,
near Island No. 10, and whipped Villipigue on the Hatchie
river. And finally overcoming all obstacles, on the 26th of
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June, 1862, trains were running continuously from Columbus
to Corinth.
On November 15, 1862, General Grant assigned him to the
coriimand of the Second division of the Army of the Ten-
nessee, then stationed at Corinth, Mississippi. This division
originally was organized by General Grant at Cairo, and had
remained under his personal command during the earlier
months of his great career ; and it was with this division he
proved to the country his metal as a soldier. Some time after
this General Dodge was assigned to the command of the
District of Corinth. July 7, 1863, he was assigned to the
command of the left wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, with
headquarters at Corinth.
Whilst in command at Corinth he perhaps rendered service
to the Government more far-reaching—combining his military
and executive duties—than any other corps commander dur-
ing that period. He held the important strategic position
which Corinth then was from a military standpoint: being at
the junction of the Mobile & Ohio and the Memphis &
Charleston railroads. It was midway between the great armies
commanded by Grant, which were thundering at the gates of
Vicksburg, and the Army of the Cumberland, commanded
by Rosecrans, with Chattanooga as the objective point. This
gave General Dodge a wide opportunity for the exercise of
his versatile and inexhaustable resources as a commanding
officer. He was engineer and railroad manager. He organ-
ized a corps of observation, and a system of scouts, through
which he kept himself informed of all the movements of the
various Rebel cavalry commands which hibernated in northern
Mississippi and western and middle Tennessee. Through
these sources, he collected news which he furnished both
Grant and Rosecrans, and which was acknowledged by both
of them to be of inestimable value. On three occasions these
Rebel cavalry commanders came so near Corinth, in their ex-
cursions through the country to replenish their supplies and
pick up a relay of fresh horses—with the ulterior purpose of
capturing any weak and unsupported detachments which they
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might chance to surprise in an unwary hour—that he marched
out to meet and drive them out of the country. On one occa-
sion he moved up into Henderson county, Tennessee, and drove
out the combined forces of Forest and Ferguson, who were
threatening Gen. Sullivan at Jackson, driving them with loss
of men and material; they barely escaping capture by fleeing
•east of the Tennessee river. Again, marching up the Tus-
cumbia valley, he drove back Forest, Van Dorn and Roddy,
keeping them employed and diverting their attention until Col.
Straight got fairly off upon his raid into northern Georgia.
Then pushing the enemy to Town creek, he swept them from
his front. In this expedition he again illustrated his unselfish
interest in the entire military ¡service, and in a brother officer.
When Col. Straight arrived atsTuscumbia, after a long march
from middle Tennessee, many of his horses were broken
down and disabled, so Gen'eral Dodge stripped his own
.cavalry, and his transportation teams, of every horse he could
spare, and turned them over^  to Colonel Straight, trusting to
his diminished transportation to supply his command. He
.also marched up the Tennessee river in the rear of Bragg's
army, going as far as Decatur, and laying waste the country,
to aid Gen. Rosecrans in his Chattanooga campaign ; and on
returning from this campaign he was followed by several hun-
dred refugees, white and black. Whilst thus constantly em-
ployed in keeping his military fences in repair, he originated
an enterprise which could only occur to an officer of liis prac-
tical mind. In northern Alabama, especially in the mountain-
ous counties, a large percentage of the population were loyal
to the Government. Many of these people, when the attempt
was made to draft them into tihe Rebel service, fled from their
homes, and hiding in swamps| and among the mountains, were
fed by trusted friends not subject to military duty, thus elud-
ing the Rebel authorities for weeks, and some of them for
months. Bat late in the summer and fall of 1862, the system
of espionage by the Rebel government became so thorough
that they knew their hiding-places would be discovered and
-that they would be forced into a service, for a cause, which
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they hated. So thousands of these people fled to the Union
lines, and hundreds were sent north, where they either found
employment, or were cared for by the Union people until the
war closed. Several hundred came into the Union lines at
Corinth. A great many fell in with Gen. Dodge's command
when making its various campaigns to meet and repel Rebel
raiders. Some of these refugees were people of social stand-
ing in the South, many of them were illiterate, but all of them
had the instinct of loyalty, and a love of liberty born of the
mountain air in which they had lived. Among those who
came into Corinth were three brothers named Smith. The
elder, Wm. H. Smith, had been a Judge of the court in north-
ern Alabama, and after the close of the war, was for two years
Governor of the State. From these refugees Gen. Dodge
determined to raise a cavalry regiment. Procuring authority
from the War Department, he secured the enlistment of such
as were willing to serve in the army, then at Corinth ; and as
fast as others came into our lines, able-bodied and of suitable
age, he gave them the choice of enlisting or going north.
Thus he raised a full regiment which he officered largely from
trained soldiers who had been either privates or officers in
northern regiments. For the colonel he took Captain Geo.
E. Spencer, who was his assistant Adjutant General. For the
lieutenant colonel he selected George L. Godfrey, the Adju-
tant of the Second Iowa Infantry, who had proved him.self a
most gallant and reliable officer. For many of the company
officers he selected privates from northern regiments who
had proved their qualities as soldiers. After he was assigned
to the command of a corps in the field. Col. Spencer was de-
tailed as his Chief of Staff, leaving Lieutenant Colonel God-
frey in command of the First Alabama Cavalry, which be-
came a most effective and gallant regiment"'.
He also while at Corinth, and during his occupancy of mid-
dle Tennessee, organized and put into service five regiments of
colored soldiers. He was a pioneer in the organization of col-
ored troops, arid pushed forward the experiment, even while
the proposition to arm the colored men was unpopular in the
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armv. There was a large number of able-bodied colored
refugees within our lines at Corinth, and of course a practical,
common-sense officer like General Dodge would begin to con-
• sider how he could utilize able-bodied people whom he had to
feed and yet were of no service to the Government. So he
organized a regiment of laborers to be used in loading and
unloading cars, in working on the railroads, as repairers, in
policing the camp, etc. He officered them and organized them
into a command similiar to a regiment. And as soon as the
authority to enlist and arm them as soldiers was granted, it
was not twenty-four hours until General Dodge had them
equipped and in readiness for the muster and the drill. The
writer remembers, at the beginning of the experiment in rais-
ing colored troops, hearing General Dodge talk with an officer
who was skeptical in regard to the wisdom of enlisting the
colored man as a soldier. Of course this opponent of arming
the negro argued that he would not fight—that putting artns
into his hands was equivalent to turning them over to the
rebels, because the rebels would eventually capture the colored
soldier and his musket. The reply of General Dodge will
never be forgotten, as it was iso emphatic and complete. Said
he : " You need not tell me the negro will not fight. His
nature is to fight. The African tribes in their native barbarism
are in a constant state of. war. Occasionally one village or
tribe will swoop down upon another and literally wipe out the
inhabitants at the cost of more than half the lives of the com-
batants on both sides. Give these people the confidence
which the drill and the use of fire-arms inspire, and put at
their head brave and intelligent officers, and I'll take the
chances on their fighting.'' ' How literally true was this diag-
nosis of the negro soldier. There was not during the War of
the Rebellion a more heroic charge than that made by Col.
Shaw at the head of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Colored
Infantry upon Fort Wagner.
There was another branch of the military service at Corinth
which was perhaps more iniportant and difficult of proper per-
formance than anything else with which General Dodge had
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to deal. It was the sort of semi-civil government he had to
administer over the citizens in the hostile territory. This
authority he exercised with unbending firmness, and yet was
careful to refrain from an unnecessary aud harassing show of
military interference with the individual. In this connection
one of the most embarrassing matters which came under his
jurisdiction was the Treasury permits to certain civilians to
deal in cotton, paying to the Government a royalty on pur-
chases. General Dodge had so much trouble with these
Treasury agents, by the information the enemy were constantly
securing through their employes aud agencies, and the whole
business withal was so demoralizing in its tendency, thpt he
finally determined to ignore all Treasury permits. These
recommendations for permits would come from the Treasury
Department to General Grant, and he would send them on to
Dodge, who would refuse to let the agents pass through our
lines. Then complaints would be made to Washington,
whence they would be sent back to Grant, who in turn would
send them to Dodge, without suggestion or recommendation.
Finally the speculators undertook to influence General Dodge
himself; which is said to have been the foundation for the
story that he wrote Grant asking to be relieved from the com-
mand, as he was afraid the cotton speculators would reach his
price.
Another incident illustrates the character of General Dodge
and his manner of intercourse with his officers and men. He
had a habit, when considering any proposition, of picking up
a piece of paper from his desk and slowly tearing it in strips;
and as his mind worked towards a conclusion the faster he
would tear off the strips of paper. In the autumn of 1863,
after the fall of Vicksburg, there was, something of a lull in
military activity in northern Mississippi, and of course officers
and soldiers, who did not foresee the campaign to middle
Tennessee, and Chattanooga, became somewhat restless and
anxious for furloughs and leaves of absence. Among others
Captain Farran, of the regular army, who was then serving on
General Dodge's staff, was anxious to get a leave. He told.
I!
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the writer that he intended to apply for a leave, and afterwards
that he had done so ; but without avail. Upon being asked
why he did not argue the matter with the General, " Oh ! " he
says, " I did try to convince hihi that it was the proper thing
to do ; and he listened patiently for a few minutes, but after
awhile he began to tear paper, and I knew the jig was up."
Finally, in the fall of 1863, General Dodge, with the left wing
of the Sixteenth Army Corps, bade adieu to Corinth and the
surrounding country, over which he had marched and counter-
marched for more than a year. He followed immediately in
the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, which had gone
forward to Chattanooga to take part in one of the most brill-
iant achievements of the war, resulting in raising the siege of
Chattanooga and putting Bragg and his army to flight.
(General Dodge's command, on leaving Corinth, of course sup-
posed their destination was Chattanooga. But on arriving in
•middle Tennessee he was halted by an order of General Grant,
and making his headquarters at Pulaski, stretched his com-
mand along the railroad extending from Nashville to Decatur.
Here General Dodge was given the opportunity to bring into
-play the marvelous versatility of his mind. General Grant
with his immense army in and about Chattanooga had but
one line of communication with the rear, and but one line of
supply for this army ; and that was the Nashville & Chatta-
nooga Railroad—a single slender thread. This road was
greatly overworked, and there was the constant danger of raids
ib}' the enemy which might interrupt even this line of supply for
some days. So General Grant determined to open another line,
by rebuilding and re-equipping the railroad from Nashville to
Decatur, where it formed a junction with the Memphis &
'Charleston Railroad, over which communication could be con-
tinued east to Stevenson, where the Nashville & Chattanooga
and Memphis & Charleston railroads formed a junction.
Whilst General Dodge was engaged in this work he had to
protect the country from the invasions of raiders, and supply
the subsistence for his army from the country. The land be-
tween Nashville, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama, although
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quite broken and cut up with small streams, is a most beauti-
ful and fertile country. The farmers along the valleys of
these streams were more thrifty than in any portion of the
South the writer had ever seen. They raised corn and
hay and oats, had extensive orchards, and many of them had
quite large herds of cattle, horses, sheep and hogs. Every
iç.^ miles there was a grist mill ; and as General Dodge had to
supply his army of 8,ooo men, and their necessary horses, from
the country, the resources of these farms were seriously taxed.
The mills were run night and day ; corn and wheat were
gathered and brought to the mills, whilst cattle, hogs and
sheep were driven together and slaughtered. For all these
supplies, vouchers were issued to the owners, leaving the
question of loyalty to be settled afterwards. Thus General
Dodge supplied his army from the resources of the country ;
and of the manner in which he rebuilt and re-equipped the
railroad. General Grant, in his Memoirs, gives a most vivid
and appreciative description, which I know the reader will
thank me for here inserting :
Sherm.in's force made an additional army, with c.ivalry, artillery and trains all
to be supplied by the single-track road from Nashville. All indications pointed
also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in east Tennessee,
twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. A single track could not do this.
I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command
of about S,doo men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his
troops along the railroad from Decatur north toward Nashville and to rebuild that
road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up
with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width and with valleys
far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the
r.iils taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not car-
ried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them.
All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur and
thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis & Charleston and the Nashville &
Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as
far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. , From Bridgeport a short dis-
tance further east the river supplements the road.
General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced rail-
road builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers—axes,
picks and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them
against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies
until the road should be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider.
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after protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surround-
ing country. He had his men and teams hring in all the grain they could Bnd,
or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be
found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of
the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for protection they
were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops with
all the iron and steel found in them were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths-
were detailed and set to work making thé tools necessary in railroad and bridge
building. Axmen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting
fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. Car builders were set
to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad
building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food was-
all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what
the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make with-
out material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already
had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To-
su|)ply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General Mcl'herson
had at Vicksburg to be sent lo Nashville, and all the cars he had e-xcept ten. I
also ordered the troops in west Tennessee!to points on the river and on the Mem-
phis & Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the
roads except the Memphis & Charleston [to Nashville. The military manager of
railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could,
bridge material. General Dodge liad the work assigned him finished wiiliin
forty days afier receiving his orders. ' The number of bridges to re-build was
one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The-
length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.
(7<7 be concluded in January number})
THE TWENTY-FOURTH IOWA VOLUNTEERS.
MUSCATINEÎ TO WINCHESTER.
If
BV THAD. ,1 L. SMITH.
(Concluded from July number.)
AFTER THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.
There is one remarkable circumstance connected with this:
brief siege, viz., while within 35 miles of Black River, whither
the cars were running, and having an almost unobstructed
communication to the rear, at rio time were we supplied with
half rations by the Government. The Fifteenth and Seven-
teenth Corps had passed through this ¡region .while en route
for Vicksburg, and left but lijttle in the country. *rhe army
'

